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Abstract
Under contingent fees the attorney gets a share of the judgment; un-
der conditional fees he gets an upscale premium if the case is won
which is, however, unrelated to the adjudicated amount. We compare
conditional and contingent fees in a framework where lawyers choose
between a safe and a risky litigation strategy. Under conditional fees
lawyers prefer the safe strategy, under contingent fess the risky one.
Risk-averse plaintiffs prefer conditional fees over contingent fees when
lawyering costs are low and vice versa for high lawyering costs.
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tives
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1 Introduction
The use of contingent legal fees is by now widespread in the US. In a well-
known empirical study, Kritzer (1990) presents suggestive data. He observes
that individual litigants tend to use contingent fees. They are mostly used
in torts (87%) and contracts (53%), whereas hourly fees are essentially used
in divorce and other domestic issues. These figures have been confirmed
and discussed in later studies by Kritzer (2002, 2004) himself as well as
by Brickman (2003a, 2003b). Also, in Canada, all provinces now permit
contingent fees.1
In Europe contingent legal fees are not allowed. Market pressure has,
nevertheless, led some countries to allow conditional fees. Under conditional
fees the lawyer gets an upscale premium if the case is won. This premium
is not related to the adjudicated amount. The United Kingdom started
introducing conditional fees in the nineties.2
Conditional fees have also been introduced in Belgium and the Nether-
lands, the latter apparently now considering to formally allow contingent
fees. Spain, France, Italy, and Portugal are considering the introduction of
conditional fees. Germany has also relaxed some restrictions by means of
third party contingent contracts, though not to the extreme of accepting
1In some provinces, but not all, the amount charged is based on a percentage. See
Kritzer (2004).
2Since 1995, English solicitors could charge clients on a conditional fee basis in which
the client pays nothing if no recovery is obtained and pays an uplift of up to 100 percent
over the normal fee if there is a recovery. In 1999, the government moved to greatly expand
the use of conditional fees in order to reduce the cost of legal aid and under provisions
of the Access to Justice Act 1999, successful plaintiffs can recover the uplift from the
defendant. Furthermore, in a 1998 decision, the Court of Appeal in England ruled that
it was no contrary to law for English solicitors to act on a contingence basis whereby the
solicitor would forgo some or all of his or her normal fee if the case was not successful. In
Scotland, lawyers have long been permitted to act on a speculative basis. If the plaintiff
wins, he or she pays the lawyer the normal fee, but pays nothing if he or she loses. In
Ireland, barristers take cases on a no goal-no fee basis, in which the barrister receives his
or her normal fee unless no recovery is obtained. For details, see Kritzer (2004).
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conditional fees (Kirstein and Rickman, 2004). Major European law firms in
Paris and in London have been basing fees in part on results achieved since
the eighties (Kritzer, 2004).
Both, contingent as well as conditional fees, pay for performance by com-
pensating the lawyer by a higher fee if the case is won. The main difference
between contingent and conditional fees is that the former pays a percentage
of the judgment whereas the latter pays an upscale premium not related to
the adjudicated amount.
In this paper we compare both fee arrangements in a set-up where the
attorney chooses the strategy on how the case is presented in the courtroom.
There are two possible strategies, safe and risky, that affect the probability
of winning as well as the amount adjudicated. A safe strategy provides a
higher probability of winning with a lower adjudication. A risky strategy
leads to a lower probability of winning with a higher adjudication. Overall,
the expected judgement is higher for the risky strategy.
We show that the risk-neutral lawyer will play it safe with conditional
fees, but will go for risk with contingent fees. Under conditional fees, the only
contingencies of interest to the attorney is winning or losing, hence he has an
incentive to maximize the probability of winning the case: conditional fees
thus give the attorney the incentive to play it safe. Contingent fees condition
not only on the events of winning or losing, but also on the amount of the
judgment: the higher the judgment, the higher the attorney’s share. The
expected judgment is higher with the risky strategy, hence the lawyer plays
it risky.
The client is risk-averse. She prefers the safe strategy if she receives
the entire amount at stake, even though the expected judgement is lower.
With this assumption we create a potential conflict of interest between the
risk-averse plaintiff and her risk-neutral lawyer. The equilibrium contract
maximizes the plaintiff’s expected utility subject to the constraint that the
lawyer gets his reservation utility. The client chooses conditional fees when
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lawyer’s reservation utility is low; this result follows immediately from our
assumption that the client prefers to play it safe when she gets the entire
judgement. When the lawyer’s reservation utility is, however, high, the client
prefers contingent fees. Now the insurance function of contingent fees kicks
in: When the lawyers’s reservation utility is high, his share of the judgement
approaches one. The plaintiff is almost fully insured and no longer cares so
much about the judgement risk; most of the judgement goes to the lawyer
anyway.
Previous literature has mostly addressed the use of percentage contingent
legal fees, but has ignored the possibility of conditional legal fees. As far as
we know, this -together with two companion papers (Emons and Garoupa
2004, Emons 2004)- are the first attempts to provide an efficiency-comparison
between US-style contingent and UK-style conditional fees. The economic
literature on conditional fees is essentially UK-based (Maclean and Rickman,
1999; Yarrow, 2001; Fenn et. al, 2004) and has been concerned with the
impact on the outcome of legal cases and the effects on the demand and
supply of legal aid.
In Emons and Garoupa (2004), we find that both, contingent and condi-
tional fees, give the lawyer an incentive to provide effort. Under conditional
fees the upscale payment is not related to the adjudicated amount. There-
fore, the lawyer’s effort does not depend on the amount at stake. Under
contingent fees the attorney gets a fraction of the judgment. He adjusts ef-
fort to the adjudicated amount: the higher the judgment, the more effort
he puts into the case. Accordingly, under contingent fees the attorney uses
his information about the amount at stake whereas under conditional fees he
does not. Therefore, contingent fees are more efficient than conditional fees.
This holds true independently of whether upfront payments to the lawyer
are restricted to be non-negative or not.
Emons (2004) compares conditional and contingent fees in a framework
where lawyers are uninformed about the clients’ cases. Payments to the
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lawyer are restricted to be non-negative. Moral hazard by lawyers rules out
fixed wage components. If there is asymmetric information about the values
of cases, in equilibrium attorneys will offer only conditional fees. If there is
asymmetric information about the risks of cases, only contingent fee contracts
are offered in equilibrium.
In the next section we describe the model and derive our results. Section
3 concludes.
2 The model
A plaintiff has been a victim of an accident or a breach of contract. She sues
the defendant to be paid damages. The plaintiff may either win or lose the
case. When the case is lost, the plaintiff gets nothing. When the plaintiff
wins, she gets either J
¯
or J̄ with J̄ > J
¯
> 0.
The strategy on how the case is presented in the courtroom determines
the probability to prevail and the judgment.3 With the safe strategy the
probability to prevail is ps. If the case is won, the plaintiff gets J
¯
with
probability q > 1/2 and J̄ with probability (1 − q). The safe strategy thus
gives rise to an expected judgment conditional on winning of E(J̃s) = qJ
¯
+
(1 − q)J̄ .
The alternative is a risky strategy. With the risky strategy the probabil-
ity to win is pr < ps. If the case is won, the plaintiff gets J
¯
with probability
(1−q) and J̄ with probability q. The risky strategy gives rise to an expected
judgment conditional on winning of E(J̃r) = (1 − q)J
¯
+ qJ̄ > E(J̃s). Ac-
cordingly, the risky strategy has a higher expected judgment conditional on
prevailing than the safe strategy, but the probability to win is lower.
As an example think of the strategies as the aggressiveness with which
the lawyer presents the case. The attorney can go, e.g., for a long discovery
3As an alternative interpretation the strategy may determine the result of an out-of-
court settlement.
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process to be on the safe side. By contrast, he can ask for an early trial,
forcing the defendant to make quick, and hopefully wrong, decisions.
We consider the case where prE(J̃r) > psE(J̃s), i.e., the expected judg-
ment is higher for the risky strategy; the risky strategy’s lower probability to
prevail is more than compensated by the higher expected judgment in case
of winning.
The plaintiff is risk averse which is represented by her utility function
over income U(·) with U ′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0. She has an initial wealth M .
With the safe strategy her expected utility is given as
EU(ps, J̃s) = psqU(M + J
¯
) + ps(1 − q)U(M + J̄) + (1 − ps)U(M)
and with risky strategy her expected utility is
EU(pr, J̃r) = pr(1 − q)U(M + J
¯
) + prqU(M + J̄) + (1 − pr)U(M).
Let
EU(ps, J̃s) > EU(pr, J̃r), (1)
i.e., as long as the plaintiff gets the entire judgment, she prefers the safe
strategy although the expected judgment is lower. The risky strategy puts
relatively more weight on the extreme outcomes of losing the case and win-
ning J̄ whereas the safe strategy puts relatively more weight on winning J
¯
. If
U(M) is sufficiently low and the utility doesn’t increase too much by winning
J̄ instead of J
¯
, the plaintiff prefers the safe strategy although its expected
judgment is lower.4
We look at the case where the expected judgment is higher with the risky
strategy, yet the expected utility is higher with the safe strategy because
this may create a conflict between the plaintiff and her lawyer as we will see
below.
4As an example take ps = 2/3, pr = 1/3, q = 1/4, J¯
= 1, J̄ = 6, U =
√ ·, and M = 2.
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To take the case to court the plaintiff needs an attorney. There is a
large set of perfectly competitive lawyers. Attorneys are risk neutral. They
provide effort e ∈ {0, v}. With zero effort the probability to prevail is zero.
With high effort v the attorney can choose the safe or the risky strategy as
described above. Effort is not observed by the client. When the lawyer is
indifferent as to the choice of effort, he goes for high effort. Lawyers only
incur the cost of effort which, for simplicity, equals the level of effort e.
Accordingly, given high effort lawyers have a reservation utility of v, i.e.,
if the plaintiff wants to implement high effort, besides providing proper in-
centives she has to offer the attorney a contract such that he gets an expected
remuneration of v. Let v ∈ [0, prE(J̃r)] so that it pays for the plaintiff to
hire an attorney and take the case to court.
The attorney picks the strategy with which the case is presented in the
courtroom. This choice is not contractible. The plaintiff may, e.g., observe
the discovery process, yet lack the expertise to tell whether the process is
relatively short or not. In case of a settlement the plaintiff often doesn’t
observe the bargaining between her attorney and the defendant; the plaintiff
only observes the outcome, see Kritzer (2004). Accordingly, a contract may
only be conditioned on the outcome; it cannot be conditioned on the choice
of strategy and on the effort level.
By giving lawyers the zero effort option, we effectively rule out contracts
entailing fixed wages. To see this, first note that we do not allow for con-
tracts with payments from the attorney to the client. We thus rule out the
possibility that the lawyer buys the case from the client and we do not allow
for penalties the lawyer has to pay to the client if the case is lost. This
restriction is implied by the champerty doctrine in the US and the forbidden
pactum cuota litis in Europe.5
5From earliest times the English system prohibited maintenance (the funding or other
support of someone elses litigation), and champerty (the taking of a share of the spoils of
litigation).
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Therefore, in our set-up conditional fees can pay the lawyer a fixed wage
plus a fixed extra if the case is won; contingent fees can give the attorney a
fixed wage plus a share of the adjudicated amount. Now suppose that under
either fee structure the fixed wage is positive. Then the lawyer can ensure
himself a positive payoff: he provides zero effort and cashes in on the fixed
wage. Due to competition this can, however, not happen in equilibrium: any
positive payoff will be competed away. In equilibrium lawyers offer contracts
the returns of which just cover their effort cost v.
Accordingly, given that we can rule out any fixed wage components, a
conditional fee contract is given by
{
d, if the case is won;
0, if the case is lost;
with d ≥ 0. A contingent fee contract is given by
{
αJ, if the case is won;
0, if the case is lost;
with α ∈ [0, 1]. In what follows we will identify a conditional fee contract by
d and a contingent fee contract by α.
Note the analogy between contingent and conditional fees and equity
contracts and standard debt contracts (without collateral) to finance risky
projects. Our cases are risky projects as are the investment opportunities of
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs need capital from investors, our clients need
effort from lawyers. Capital/effort are lost when the project fails/when the
case is lost.
Under equity finance the investor gets a share of the project’s returns.
So does the attorney under contingent fees. Under a standard debt contract
the investor gets a fixed payment (interest plus principle) in non-bankruptcy
states and nothing in bankruptcy states. Under conditional fees the attor-
ney gets a fixed premium if the case is won and nothing when the case is
lost. Accordingly, contingent and conditional fees generate the same payoff
structure as equity and standard debt finance. See Emons (2004).
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Under the conditional fee contract d with high effort v the lawyer’s ex-
pected utility with the safe strategy is EV (d, ps, J̃s) = psd − v; under the
risky strategy his expected utility amounts to EV (d, pr, J̃r) = prd − v. Un-
der conditional fees the attorney gets the bonus d when he wins the case,
independently of the judgment. Since ps > pr, the lawyer chooses the safe
strategy under conditional fees. By conditioning only on the contingencies of
winning and losing, the attorney has an incentive to maximize the probabil-
ity of winning the case: conditional fees thus give the attorney the incentive
to play it safe.
Under the contingent fee contract α with high effort v the lawyer’s ex-
pected utility with the safe strategy is EV (α, ps, J̃s) = αpsE(J̃s) − v; under
the risky strategy his expected utility amounts to EV (α, pr, J̃r) = αprE(J̃r)−
v. Contingent fees condition not only on the events of winning and losing
but also on the amount of the judgment: the higher the judgment, the higher
the attorney’s share. Since prE(J̃r) > psE(J̃s), the lawyer chooses the risky
strategy under contingent fees. The expected judgment is higher with the
risky strategy. Contingent fees give the attorney a share of the judgment.
Therefore, under contingent fees the lawyer prefers the risky strategy.
To summarize the attorney’s incentives:
Proposition 1: Under contingent fees the lawyer chooses the risky strategy
whereas under conditional fees he prefers the safe strategy.
Let us now look at the plaintiff’s expected utility taking the attorney’s
behavior into account. Under conditional fees the lawyer chooses the safe
strategy and the client’s expected utility is
EU(d, ps, J̃s) = psqU(M + J
¯
− d) + ps(1 − q)U(M + J̄ − d) + (1 − ps)U(M).
Whenever the case is won, the plaintiff pays the lawyer the conditional fee
d. The lawyer plays it safe, but plaintiff and attorney do not share the
judgement risk: the spread for the plaintiff is (J̄ − J
¯
).
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Under contingent fees the lawyer chooses the risky strategy and the
client’s expected utility is
EU(α, pr, J̃r) = pr(1−q)U(M+(1−α)J
¯
)+prqU(M+(1−α)J̄)+(1−pr)U(M).
Under contingent fees the plaintiff gets her share (1 − α) of the judgment.
Here the lawyer goes for the risky strategy and at the same time insures the
plaintiff: the spread for the plaintiff is (1 − α)(J̄ − J
¯
).
Since there is a large set of perfectly competitive attorneys, the equi-
librium contract maximizes the plaintiff’s expected utility subject to the
constraint that the lawyer earns his reservation utility v. It turns out that
for low levels of the lawyer’s reservation utility v the plaintiff prefers the
conditional contract, for high levels of v she goes for the contingent contract.
Proposition 2: There exists a unique v̂ ∈ (0, prE(J̃r)) such that for v ≤ v̂
the equilibrium is given by the conditional fee contract d∗ = v/ps and for
v > v̂ by the contingent fee contract α∗ = v/(prE(J̃r)), v ∈ [0, prE(J̃r)].
Proof: Under the conditional fee d∗ = v/ps the lawyer picks the safe strategy
and EV (d∗, ps, J̃s) = psd∗−v = 0; under the contingent fee α∗ = v/(prE(J̃r))
he goes for the risky strategy and EV (α∗, ps, J̃s) = α∗prE(J̃s) − v = 0.
Accordingly, under both contracts the lawyer breaks even with high effort.
Let us now look at the plaintiff. For v = 0, assumption (1) implies
EU(d∗, ps, J̃s) > EU(α∗, pr, J̃r). For v > psE(J̃s), the client’s expected in-
come with the conditional fee and safe strategy equals M + psE(J̃s) − v <
M . Since the expected utility is less than the utility of the expected in-
come, EU(d∗, ps, J̃s) < U(M) for v > psE(J̃s). Under the contingent fee
EU(α∗, pr, J̃r) ≥ U(M) for v ∈ [psE(J̃s), prE(J̃r)].
EU(d∗, ps, J̃s) and EU(α∗, pr, J̃r) are both continuous in v. Thus, the in-
termediate value theorem implies the existence of v̂ such that EU(v̂/ps, ps, J̃s)
= EU(v̂/(prE(J̃r)), pr, J̃r). Uniqueness of v̂ follows from the observation that
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∂EU(d∗, ps, J̃s)/∂v < ∂EU(α∗, pr, J̃r)/∂v for all v ∈ [0, prE(J̃r)] which we
show in the Appendix.
Q.E.D.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. When v is low, the plaintiff
gets most of judgement under contingent and conditional fees. Assumption 1
implies that she prefers to play it safe in this case and, accordingly, she goes
for conditional fees. When v is large, the attorney gets most of the surplus.
Under contingent fees the attorney’s share α of the judgement approaches
one: he bears most of the judgement risk. Since the plaintiff is almost fully
insured, she no longer cares much about the judgement risk. Thus, she prefers
contingent fees to conditional fees where, despite the high d, the judgement
spread is still (J̄ − J
¯
). To put it differently: The higher v, the stronger
becomes the insurance function of contingent fees.
3 Conclusions
In this paper we want highlight two points. First, conditional fees give the
lawyer an incentive to maximize the probability of winning the case. Under
contingent fees the attorney maximizes the expected judgement. Second, if
the plaintiff is risk averse, there may be a conflict of interest between the
plaintiff and her lawyer. If the cost of hiring a lawyer is low, the plaintiff
seeks insurance through conditional fees which induce the safe bet. If, by
contrast, lawyers are expensive, the plaintiff prefers contingent fees shifting
most of the judgement risk to the lawyer.
One implication of the paper is that in a regime where conditional fees
are allowed but contingent fees are forbidden, we should expect inefficient
contracting for high costs of lawyering. Conditional fees do not allow for the
sharing of the risk of a high or a low judgement. Compared to fixed wages
they do, however, share the risk of winning and losing the case.
A second implication of the paper is the choice of lawyer fees as a response
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to the tension between plaintiff and lawyer concerning the litigation strategy.
Therefore, an important aspect is how much control plaintiffs have over the
choice of litigation strategy. Corporate clients usually keep a significant
control over litigation, in part due to in-house legal counselling. For them
the tension we analyze seems to be less of a problem. Individual clients
usually lack the expertise to exert any significant control over their cases.
For these clients conditional fees can be a useful means to induce a safe
litigation strategy. To put it in terms of our example: a client can be assured
that under conditional fees the lawyer behaves less aggressively than under
contingent fees.
One argument against contingency fees is that they induce lawyers to
settle cases too quickly. The attorney’s return per hour invested in the case
is higher if the case is settled rather than taken to court; see, e.g., Kritzer
(2004). If we interpret the safe litigation strategy as going for a quick settle-
ment, then this criticism applies even more to conditional fees.
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Appendix
Here we show that the plaintiff’s expected utility decreases more with v under
conditional than under contingent fees.
∂EU(d∗, ps, J̃s)
∂v
<
∂EU(α∗, pr, J̃r)
∂v
⇐⇒
E(J̃r)[qU
′(M + J
¯
− d∗) + (1 − q)U ′(M + J̄ − d∗)] >
J
¯
(1 − q)U ′(M + (1 − α∗)J
¯
) + J̄qU ′(M + (1 − α∗)J̄) ⇐⇒
LHS :=
[qJ
¯
+ q2(J̄ − J
¯
)]U ′(M + J
¯
− d∗) − (J
¯
− qJ
¯
)U ′(M + (1 − α∗)J
¯
) >
qJ̄U ′(M + (1 − α∗)J̄) − [(J
¯
− 2qJ
¯
+ qJ̄ − q2(J̄ − J
¯
)]U ′(M + J̄ − d∗) :=
RHS
LHS > [2qJ
¯
− J
¯
+ q2(J̄ − J
¯
)]U ′(M + J
¯
− d∗) >
[2qJ
¯
− J
¯
+ q2(J̄ − J
¯
)]U ′(M + (1 − α∗)J̄) > RHS
where the second inequality holds because J
¯
− d∗ < (1 − α∗)J̄ for all v ∈
[0, prE(J̃r)].
Q.E.D.
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